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I.R.C. Section 119: Is Convenience of
the Employer a Valid Concept?
By ADRL4aN A. KRAGEN*
KLONDA SPEER"0
The operation of the income tax laws has long been considered
a competitor to the pyramids as a mysterious phenomenon. Laymen
and even many lawyers consider the structure of the income tax laws
to be incomprehensible and, what is worse, inequitable. The multi-
tude of interpretations by the courts and the Internal Revenue Service
has compounded the confusion. In recent years there have been
many statements by the media and by commentators on the tax sys-
tem to the effect that the tax laws impact unequally on the rich and
the poor and that the person of means can hire the talent, legal or
accounting, to insure the minimization or even elimination of tax
liability. We also know that the average citizen has extreme difficulty
in understanding the concept that "income" for tax purposes includes
all realized accessions to wealth. The idea that the money that
Cesarini' found in the piano or that James2 embezzled should con-
stitute taxable income to them is extremely hard for the average tax-
payer to comprehend. Such taxpayer may applaud the idea that
Duberstein 3 should be forced to include in income the value of the
Cadillac his friend gave to him, but he is hard put to reconcile this
with the fact that another individual might be allowed to give the
same model Cadillac to a good friend without incurring any income
tax liability.
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law; Professor Emeritus, University
of California at Berkeley. A.B., 1931, J.D., 1934, University of California at Berkeley.
0* B.A., 1967, University of Kansas. Member, Second Year Class.
1. Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969), aff'd per curiam,
428 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1970).
2. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
3. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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This same lack of understanding of statutorily, administratively,
or judicially imposed tax rules pervades the area to be considered in
this Article. Individuals who think about the subject (and there
appear to be few) voice bewilderment at the fact that waiters who
eat at the establishment at which they work may not be required to
include the value of their meals in income for income tax purposes
while the accountant for the restaurant eating meals at the same
place would probably have to include their value as a part of gross
income. Equally bewildering is the fact that an executive who is
furnished luxurious housing by his employer might not be required
to pay rent or to include its value in income for federal income tax
purposes.
In view of the substantial amount of discussion concerning the
imperfections of our federal tax system and its apparent inequities,'
it is somewhat surprising that there has been so little public comment:
in regard to the operation of Internal Revenue Code section 119.'!
It is the authors' position that section 119 as currently interpreted
results in inconsistent treatment of taxpayers similarly situated, as well
as substantial revenue loss, 7 and that the section should be repealed or
amended to remove the reasons for its current inequitable operation.
The Common Law Rule
Section 119 does not represent a recent development in the law,
nor is that section really the creature of congressional action or of
4. See, e.g., P. STERN, THE RAPE OF THE TAXPAYER (1973).
5. For treatment of § 119 in response to specific cases or problems, see Hipple,
New Third Circuit Decision Expands Meals Exclusion Under Section 119, 40 J. TAX.
330 (1974); Jordan, Can Cash Payments to Employees Be Excluded as Meals Under
Section 119?, 45 J. TAX. 310 (1976); Note, Internal Revenue - Section 119 - Meaning
of "Business Premises of the Employer," 33 Mo. L. REV. 163 (1968).
6. Section 119 reads as follows: "There shall be excluded from gross income of
in employee the value of any meals or lodging furnished to him by his employer for the
convenience of the employer, but only if-
(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises
of the employer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such lodging
on the business premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.
In determining whether meals or lodging are furnished for the convenience of the
employer, the provisions of an employment contract or of a State statute fixing terms
of employment shall not be determinative of whether the meals or lodging are intended
as compensation."
7. Estimated to he $330-400-million in 1977. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX-
ATION, 95TH CONG., 2d SESS., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES (Comm. Print
1977).
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lobbying by special interest groups. For a long period prior to the
enactment of section 119, the Internal Revenue Service and the courts
tussled with the question of when meals and lodging furnished by an
employer should be excluded from the gross income of the employee.
As early as 1921, the Treasury ruled in an office decision that
lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer was excludable
from income if it was not regarded as part of the compensation of the
employee.8 That ruling and a number of others in the 1920's and
1930's simply stated, without explanation, that, if the furnishing of
meals and lodging was not intended as compensation and was for the
convenience of the employer, the value was not included in income. 9
These pronouncements contained no analysis or reasoning and did
not consider the possibility that, at least to some extent, there may
have been an unexpressed compensation factor even when convenience
of the employer was determined to be the primary factor. There was
in fact practically no definition of what constituted "employer con-
venience." An examination of the early rulings indicates that the
Service was somewhat confused as to whether, in addition to the
requirement that the furnishing of such items be for the convenience
of the employer, it was necessary that the employer require the em-
ployee to use the meals or lodging.10
The first major case to consider the general problem of the ex-
clusion of employer-furnished meals and lodging was Jones v. United
States." The question in Jones concerned the inclusion of the value
of quarters furnished to United States Army officers and commutation
furnished in lieu thereof. Although the opinion primarily addressed
the issue of congressional intent concerning the validity of distinguish-
ing between pay and allowances, the court made some statements
indicating the criteria it considered appropriate in a determination
8. O.D. 914, 4 C.B. 85 (1921). Not all of the earlier decisions concerning what
would now be a § 119 question mentioned the term "convenience of the employer."
None offered guidelines for exclusion. O.D. 814, 4 C.B. 84, 84-5, (1921); O.D. 514,
2 C.B. 90 (1920); O.D. 265, 1 C.B. 71 (1919); O.D. 11, 1 C.B. 66 (1919).
9. E.g., O.D. 915, 4 C.B. 85 (1921); I.T. 2253, V-1 C.B. 32 (1926).
10. Compare O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920) (no mention of employees being re-
quired to accept supper money) and T.D. 2992, 2 C.B. 76 (1920) (convenience of
employer only requirement) with O.D. 915, 4 C.B. 85, 85-86 (1921) (hospital em-
ployees subject to 24-hour call "and on that account are required to accept quarters
and meals") and T.D. 4965, 1940-1 C.B. 13 (restatement of "convenience of employer"
rule to include "required to accept" test).
11. Jones v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 552 (1925).
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that meals or lodging should be excluded from income. The court
stated that "[t]he officer is not paid a salary and furnished a house to
live in for his services; he is, on the contrary, paid a salary to live in
the quarters furnished." 12 The court further endeavored to demon-
strate that it considered this to be an absurd attempt by the Internal
Revenue Service to include quarters in income on the basis that, if
quarters were not furnished, the officer would have to rent lodging.
The court noted that no one would expect a government attorney to
pay income tax on the value of an office furnished to him simply be-
cause an attorney in private practice would be forced to rent his own
office. Therefore, reasoned the court, just as the government official
would not be required to add to income the value of his office, the
Army officer should not be required to include in income the value
of his quarters. In neither case would the individual be able to do
his job for the employer without those facilities.1 3
Subsequent to Jones, both the Internal Revenue Service and the
courts issued rulings on a variety of specific fact situations with little
explanation for the rulings beyond a refusal to exclude meals or lodging
from income unless it was shown that they were not intended as com-
pensation to the employee. In Kitchen v. Commissioner14 the court
held that the value of meals and lodging furnished a hotel manager
and his wife were includable in income because there was no showing
that they were furnished solely for the convenience of the employer
and further, there was no showing that the wife had performed serv-
ices. Three years later the same court held in Benaglia v. Commis-
sioner15 that meals and lodging furnished a hotel manager and his
wife were excludable because they were furnished solely on the basis
that the manager could not otherwise perform his duties. The facts
in Kitchen and Benaglia as recited in the opinions are not distinguish-
able, and further there was no evidence in Benaglia relative to services
furnished by the wife. In Ellis v. Commissioner6 the court departed
from the "solely" requirement and held that an apartment house mana-
ger was entitled to allocate and therefore to exclude a portion of the
lodging's value when the apartment was furnished in part for the
convenience of the employer. In Papineau v. Commissioner'7 the
12. Id. at 570.
13. Id. at 577.
14. 11 B.T.A. 855 (1928).
15. 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937).
16. 6 T.C. 138 (1946).
17. 16 T.C. 130 (1951).
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court ignored the "solely" question altogether and, in allowing an
unallocated exclusion, disregarded any value to the employee from
the lodging furnished to a hotel manager.'
In Carmichael v. Commissioner,"9 the court narrowed the range
of cases in which the convenience of the employer test would be
satisfied. The court examined the situation of a number of employees
of a government housing project and stated that convenience of the
employer means "not merely the request, direction or pleasure of the
employer but that the inherent nature of the employment requires
that the employee occupy premises supplied by the employer ... .2
The difficulty of application of this test was illustrated by the court's
own effort in this regard when it held that employees who were not
required to be on duty twenty-four hours were required to include
the value of housing in income but made an exception for an elderly
lady on the night shift who, because of her age, could not go to
and from the place of employment.
Contemporaneously with the above rulings the courts began to
return to the distinction between those cases in which there was
evidence of an intent to compensate and those in which such evi-
dence was not present and began to expand the area where exclusion
was held not to be proper.2' The courts began to find an intent to
compensate when the employee was required to live or take meals
for the convenience of the employer but the employer deducted some
amount for the lodging or meals and held such amount to be in-
cludable in income. In Doran v. Commissioner22 the Tax Court
denied the exclusion and stated that compensation and convenience
of the employer are not alternative propositions;2 3 rather convenience
of the employer is only one factor in determining whether the value
18. A much-quoted revenue ruling furnished a basis for disregarding the compen-
sation factor altogether: "If, however, the living quarters or meals furnished are not
compensatory or are furnished for the convenience of the employer, the value thereof
need not be added to the compensation otherwise received by the employee." Mim.
5023, 1940-1 C.B. 14, 15 (emphasis added).
19. 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 278 (1948).
20. Id. at 281.
21. The Commissioner had tightened the requirements for exclusion in Mim. 6472,
1950-1 C.B. 15, where "convenience of the employer" was defined as "simply an ad-
ministrative test to be applied only in cases in which the compensatory character of
such benefits is not otherwise determinable."
22. 21 T.C. 374 (1953).
23. Id. at 376.
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of living quarters is compensation. These new holdings increased
the inequity in the determination of when the furnishing of meals or
lodging was not an item of income. If lodging and meals were pro-
vided admittedly for the convenience of the employer and the em-
ployee was required to accept the meals or lodging, there would ap-
pear to be no logical basis for differentiation between apartment
manager A who was paid a salary of $500 per month and required
to live in an apartment, the normal rental of which was $300, and
B who was paid $800 per month and required to live in an apart-
ment with the landlord deducting $300 per month. In fact, two
years after Doran the Second Circuit, in Diamond v. Sturr,24 adopted
the above reasoning, declared the Commissioner's position "arbitrary
and formalistic," 2 5 and allowed a State employee to exclude even
though his meals and lodging were characterized as compensation
by operation of State law.
As the examples given above illustrate, the rulings and cases
lacked cohesiveness and certainty to the extent that it became nearly
impossible to advise employers and employees as to their tax liability.
Semantic criteria imposed by the IRS and the courts made the ulti-
mate results devoid of reality. It was comparatively easy to devise
a plan under which an employee could avoid inclusion in income of
lodging and meals if the nature of the employer's business was such
as to give some support to the concept that the items were furnished
for the employer's convenience. If, however, for the purpose of an
employer's accounting records or his complying with requirements
of a regulatory authority or a governmental employer there was an
amount recorded as a "charge" for the meals and lodging, the un-
fortunate employee would be required to include the value in income
although the transaction realistically was no different than if there
had been no such recording. "6 Only if the employee could prove
the entry was solely for bookkeeping purposes and not a true charge
could the value of the accommodations possibly be excludedY.2
There was no assurance, however, that exclusion would be the result.
The cases also indicated much uncertainty as to whether it was suffi-
cient that there simply be a right of choice to use the facilities or
24. 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955).
25. Id. at 268.
26. Mim. 6472, 1950-1 C.B. 15.
27. Farnham v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 1049 (1947).
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whether there needed to be a definite requirement that such facili-
ties be used.28
In what was proclaimed to be. an effort to obtain some uniformity
of determination and to set forth guidelines for the unwary, the 1954
codification included, as section 119,29 a specific provision excluding
meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer if
they meet the criteria set forth in the statute.
Section 119 of the 1954 Code
The original measure proposed by the House contained no refer-
ence to the term "convenience of the employer." It provided instead
that meals and lodging were to be excluded from the employee's
income if they were furnished at the place of employment and if the
employee was required to accept them as a condition of employ-
ment.30 The Senate added the convenience of the employer re-
quirement as the third test of the section and substituted the language
"business premises of the employer" for "place of employment."31
Both the House and Senate were particularly concerned that the
section address the Service's position that characterization of meals
or lodging as compensation required their inclusion in income.32
Therefore section 119 provided that, even though the lodging or
meals were characterized by the employer as compensation, they
should not be included in income as a result of that fact alone if the
other requirements of the rule were met.3 3 In the last sentence of
the section the Senate sought to emphasize that, when an employee
otherwise meets the requirements of section 119, the exclusion will
not be defeated by the fact that state law regards his meals and
lodging as part of his compensation. In addition, the Senate gloss
to the bill indicated that the exclusion applies only to meals and
28. See Bennett v. Commissioner, 1 T.C.M. (CCH) 31, 38-39 (1942); Mini. 6472,
1950-1 C.B. 15-16; Mina. 5023, 1940-1 C.B. 14-15.
29. See note 6 supra.
30. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 4017, 4042, 4175-76.
31. S. CEP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4621, 4825-26.
32. See Mira. 6472, 1950-1 C.B. 15; Doran v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 374 (1953).
See notes 21-22 & accompanying text supra.
33. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CoDE CONG.
& An. NEws 4017, 4175.
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lodging furnished in kind and that cash allowances would continue
to be includable in gross income "to the extent that such allowances
constitute compensation.."34
Notwithstanding the expressed intention of the legislature to
"end the confusion" surrounding the convenience of the employer
rule,35 the Senate amendments to H.R. 8300 as adopted were the
source of much comment when the Commissioner and courts began
to apply section 119. The addition of the common law term, "con-
venience of the employer," as a third test was interpreted in two dif-
ferent ways: either as evidencing an intent to continue the exclu-
sions formerly allowed by the rule 3" or, in other instances, as again
emphasizing that an employee would not be denied the exclusion
on the basis of the employer's characterization of the meals or lodg-
ing as compensatory, when the actual conditions of employment
made the furnishing of meals or lodging necessary in order for the
employee to perform his work properly. 37 The Senate's substitution
of "business premises" for the term "place of employment" in the
House bill has also caused confusion. Both terms were intended to
have the same effect,A However, courts have justified a broad read-
ing of the "business premises" test.:"  For example, in the state
trooper cases "business premises" of the state has been held to mean
all areas within its boundaries. 40  Finally, the Senate comment that
cash payment would be included in gross income "to the extent that
it represents compensation"'"4 has been an additional source of con-
fusion. The Senate comment has been used to buttress the position
of many state troopers who received cash reimbursements for their
meals in their argument that where the other requirements of section
34. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CoNe.
& AD. NEWS 4621, 4825.
35. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE Cox(..
& AD. NEws 4017, 4042.
36. See text accompanying notes 131-40 infra.
37. Dole v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 697, 706, aff'd per curiam, 351 F.2d 308 (lst
Cir. 1965).
38. The conference report stresses that even under the changed wording a room
furnished a domestic servant in the employer's home will be regarded as on the "'buis-
ness premises." H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2(1 Sess., reprinted in [19541 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5280, 5286.
39. Dole v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 697, 709-11 (Scott, J., concurring), aff'd per
curiam, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965).
40. See text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
41. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODe CON(..
& An. NEws 4621, 4825.
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119 were met, the reimbursement was "noncompensatory" and there-
fore excludable. 42  A more logical interpretation is that the Senate
committee simply intended to make clear that meals and lodging
deductable under Internal Revenue Code section 162 would not be
affected by the provisions of section 119.
43
The premise underlying exclusion in section 119 is that the
greater the employer's control of the employee's enjoyment of the
meals or lodging, the less likely they will be considered as compen-
sation and the less directly will the employee be held to have been
benefited. If the employee is benefited only indirectly, the value of
the accommodations provided will be excluded from income, even
though some compensation factor is present. In enacting section
119, Congress intended to allow the exclusion in two situations:
when the employee who is required to be continuously on call is
provided meals or lodging on the premises where he or she performs
the work and when the employer must furnish eating or lodging fa-
cilities in order for work to be performed, because no accommoda-
tions are available otherwise. In both of these situations, the em-
ployer exerts a maximum amount of control over the employee's
enjoyment of the meals and lodging.
Notwithstanding congressional attempts to establish clear criteria
for exclusion which could be easily applied, passage of section 119
did not cure the uncertainty surrounding the convenience of the em-
ployer rule. Courts at all levels have denied exclusions to some em-
ployees when it clearly appeared that the section was intended to
cover their situations and have granted exclusions to other employees
when it is questionable that the statute so intended.
Interpretation of Section 119
Convenience of the Employer
The "convenience of the employer" and "required as a condition
of employment" criteria have been merged consistently by the courts
44
and therefore will be treated together in this Article. Both tests
have been reinterpreted to require a showing that the employment may
42. E.g., United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199, 204 (8th Cir. 1966).
43. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 98 S. Ct. 315, 325 (1977).
44. See United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 334 F.2d
660, 663-64 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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be performed properly only if the employer furnishes lodging or
meals.45  Accordingly, it is not necessary that an employee be for-
mally required by his employer to accept the accommodation in or-
der that its value be excluded from income, so long as the employee's
presence is necessary to the functioning of the business. 46  If an
employer merely prefers that the employee accept the meals or lodg-
ing,47 however, their value normally will not be excluded from the
employee's gross income. 48
Early cases examined the convenience of the employer test in
light of the amount of choice exercised by the employee notwith-
standing the fact that he ostensibly was required by his employer
to accept the housing.49 In 01kier v. Commissioner,5° the court held
the value of housing and meals excludable when only employer-
furnished housing was available to the taxpayer, a project engineer
on a construction job in Greenland, on the ground that the employee
had no choice but to accept the housing. Additionally, lack of avail-
ability of housing will not be a factor if the employee must be con-
stantly on call in order to perform his job.5'
45. S. REP. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4621, 4825; Mim. 5023, 1940-1 C.B. 14; Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(b), T.D. 6745,
1964-2 C.B. 42.
46. Caratan v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 334 F.2d 660, 662 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
"It seems to us that the practical imperative should govern, rather than an express
order by the employer, for the latter could be dissimulated." Adams v. United States,
77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9613 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
In Dole v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 697, 705-06 (1965), the court concluded that,
even though mill employees were required to be on 24-hour call and no other housing
was available close to the mill, the rental value of housing could not be exempted be-
cause the employer merely expressed a preference that the employees live in the houses.
Dole was affirmed per curiam, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965), on the basis of the con-
curring opinion by Judge Raum which strictly interpreted the business premises test,
thus reinforcing the position that form need not be exalted when applying the "required
as a condition of employment" test.
47. Although § 119 does not apply the "required as a condition of employment"
criterion to meals furnished by the employer, this requirement may be a factor in de-
termining whether the meals are furnished for the convenience of the employer. Treas.
Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i), -1(a)(3)(i), -1(d)(1), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42. Ac-
cordingly meals and lodging exclusions will be discussed together here. When diver-
gences in the treatment of the exclusions occur in the cases they will be noted.
48. Heyward v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 739, 745 (1961).
49. If the employee may choose whether or not to accept the housing or meals,
the value is, of course, not excludable. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(3)(i), -1(b)(2),
-1(d)(6), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42.
50. 32 T.C. 464 (1959).
51. "In light of the specific language of Treas. Reg. § 119-1(b), it does not appear
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The court in United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v.
United States5 2 considered availability of housing not to be a stum-
bling block for exclusion even when the employee was not on twenty-
four-hour call. 5 3 It that case, the United States Junior Chamber of
Commerce furnished a large residence (the "Vhite House") in Tulsa
to its president, a member elected to a one-year term. The presi-
dent's position required that he entertain extensively and that he
frequently hold evening business meetings. The Service did not dis-
pute the fact that the official functions of the president required the
use of such a house but denied the exclusion because, with other
suitable residences available in the area, it was not necessary for
the employer to furnish the particular house to the employee. The
Court of Claims held the rental value of the house properly excluded
from the employee's income, pointing out that if choice alone were
the issue, even Mr. Olkjer"4 could have been required by his employer
to provide his own housetrailer at the jobsite. The court refused
to adopt a strict construction of the rule, noting that few cases could
satisfy such an "abstract concept of necessity."55 The test would be
satisfied when "as a practical matter" the employee must accept the
lodging.
Providing the Jaycee White House to the Jaycee president
was plainly a case of employer convenience because of the special
facts of the employment.5 By eliminating from its consideration
that the mere availability of nearby housing, so heavily relied upon by the Tax Court,
was intended to require a different result. The language of the regulation which
pertains to the feasibility of performance without the furnished housing (i.e., 'because
the employee could not perform the services required of him unless he is furnished
such lodging') is joined disjunctively ('or') with the phrase concerning the requirement
that the employee be available at all times. If the regulation intended that an em-
ployee whose duties required constant availability also must have no access to feasible
alternative housing, the two phrases would have been joined conjunctively ('and')."
Caratan v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 606, 610 (9th Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).
52. 334 F.2d 660 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
53. By not requiring that the availability of housing test be met, the court may
have confused the 24-hour on-call situation with that in which the employee, although
performing some duties at times and places outside the normal work day and office,
nevertheless exercises almost complete discretion over how and when the duties of
employment will be performed.
54. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
55. United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 334 F.2d 660,
664 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
56. The J'aycee president was required to headquarter in Tulsa, Oklahoma for one
year, possibly incurring double expenditures for housing. Also, the president was gen-
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the availability of housing test when the employee was not on twenty-
four-hour call, however, the court ignored the basic premise of sec-
tion 119, which is to exclude the value of accommodations furnished
only when the employer retains maximum control over the employee's
enjoyment of them. Furnishing meals or lodging for a substantial
noncompensatory business reason is not equivalent to furnishing meals
or lodging without which the employee may not perform his job.
The strict necessity test is no longer a detriment to seeking exclusion
if Junior Chamber is the law; this test has in fact been greatly relaxed
in recent cases.
The "direct nexus" test for determining convenience of the em-
ployer was enunciated in McDonald v. Commissioner,57 in which the
Tax Court stated that there must be a certain degree of connection
between satisfactory performance of an employee's duties and the
furnishing of housing. In that case the employer, Gulf Oil, argued
that it provided housing to United States citizens employed at its
Tokyo operation in order to facilitate their transfer. Gulf also ar-
gued that the company was primarily benefited because it would
otherwise have difficulty both in obtaining employees for the Japanese
operation and in insuring their satisfactory performance free from
worries about the basics of existence in a new and foreign environ-
ment. The court indicated that the case could have been decided
solely on either the convenience of the employer or the business
premises issue. The court discussed both issues, however, and held
that, while Gulf was undeniably benefited by the practice, the em-
ployees were the ones who were primarily benefited. Improved effi-
ciency, lack of availability of American-style lodging, and difficulty
in obtaining employees to work overseas, the court determined, did
not provide a sufficiently direct nexus between the furnished lodging
and the employer's convenience to bring the case within the ambit
of section 119.
In August 1977, the Court of Claims decided Adams v. United
States,58 a case which on its facts was strikingly similar to McDonald.
Fanuiel Adams, president of Mobil Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha, a Tokyo
erally a young man of limited income who could not be expected to obtain facilities
of the type required on his own. Third, the employer would be greatly inconvenienced
by the alternative of paying a salary and requiring the new president to seek such
housing - a situation tantamount to moving a portion of its offices each year.
57. 66 T.C. 223 (1976).
58. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9613 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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corporation wholly owned by Mobil Oil Corporation, was provided
by his employer with a "choice" three-level residence located three
miles from Sekiyu's headquarters. Residences were routinely pro-
cured for Mobil employees both as part of a policy of attracting
qualified employees to the Japan operation and for the purpose of
removing inequities in employment conditions between Japan and
United States based employees. The house, which had been built
by Mobil expressly for its chief executive officer, was designed to be
used for business activity as well as for the president's personal use.
Mr. Adams was required to live in this residence because the com-
pany felt "prestigious surroundings" for its president were necessary
in Japan for reasons of "face": "[i]f the president of Sekiyu had not
resided in a residence equivalent to the type provided the plaintiff,
he would have been unofficially downgraded and slighted by the
business community and his effectiveness for Sekiyu correspondingly
impaired." 9 Adams included in income only the amount subtracted
from his salary for comparable housing in the United States ° and
contended the remainder was excludable from gross income under
section 119.
In applying the direct nexus test, the Court of Claims relied on
many of the same business interest factors held insufficient in Mc-
Donald v. Commissioner."' The court held that, when these factors
were added to the factors of "prestige consideration" and Sekiyu's for-
mal requirement that its president live in the furnished residence, 62 the
scales were tipped in favor of employer convenience. The court also
restated the direct nexus test to require a close relationship between
the housing furnished and the "business interests of the employer"
(as opposed to "satisfactory performance of the employee's duties").63
This slight shift in emphasis has the potential effect of allowing ex-
clusion to a number of taxpayers in cases when it is difficult to sep-
arate regular compensation from the business interest of the employer
59. Id. at 88,055.
60. $4,439 in 1970 and $4,824 in 1971. Id.
61. 66 T.C. 223 (1976). The factors relied on by the Court of Claims included
the claims that Sekiyu otherwise would have had difficulty in attracting suitable em-
ployees and that the housing subsidy was designed to maintain an equitable compen-
sation relationship between domestic and foreign-based employees. See Adams v.
United States, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ir 9613 at 88,057 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
62. The formal requirement of the employer is not dispositive of the test in any
jurisdiction. See note 48 & accompanying text supra.
63. Adams v. United States, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. If 9613 at 88057 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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but when the employment could be performed quite satisfactorily
without the furnishing of lodging or meals.
If prestige is the only factor distinguishing Adams v. United
States6 4 from McDonald v. Commissioner 5 and if Adams is the law
as to interpretation of the convenience of the employer rule, almost
any business executive whose employer can conjure up a sufficient
"business interest" which dictates the furnishing of meals or lodging
will be allowed to exclude their value from income. A taxpayer in
essentially the same posture with less creative counsel will receive
no such exclusion. Similarly, an employee, such as McDonald" '; or
Olkjer,37 who is provided with accommodations by the employer
because the employee would find it difficult to acquire lodging or
meals for herself may be denied the exclusion on the grounds that
providing the meals or lodging "directly" benefits both employer and
employee. Although it is debatable whether section 119 was in-
tended to provide for exclusion in either the McDonald or Adams
cases, to allow the exclusion in one situation and not the other does
not seem warranted by the language or statutory history of section
119.
Another area of inconsistency in present application of the con-
venience of the employer rule is the distinction between cases in which
the employer furnishes meals or lodging and cases in which, for iden-
tical reasons, the employer pays higher wages or gives cash reim-
bursement for meals or lodging. The employer who provides hous-
ing or meals and "requires" that the employee accept them provides
the employee with additional compensation in the form of an exclu-
sion from income which is not afforded to a worker whose employer
merely requires that the duties of employment be performed satis-
factorily and leaves where the employee lives and what he eats to
the employee.
Two examples from the Treasury Regulations illustrate the effect
of the distinction. Under Treasury Regulation 1.119-1(d)(3),,-' a
bank teller who is furnished meals on the bank premises without
charge because he has only a thirty-minute lunch break is allowed
64. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9613 (Ct. CI. 1977).
65. 66 T.C. 223 (1976).
66. McDonald v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 223 (1976).
67. Olkjer v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 464 (1959). See text accompanying note
50 supra.
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(d)(3), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42.
[Vol. 29THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
CONVENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER
to exclude the value of his meals from income, if during that time
he would be unable to obtain a meal outside the bank. Treas-
ury Regulation 1.119-1(d)(8) ,69 refuses to allow factory workers
who purchase their meals from the factory cafeteria to exclude their
value because those employees have the choice of bringing their
meals or eating in the lunchroom. The stated distinctions between
the above illustrations - that the bank teller's lunchbreak is short
and that the factory employees have the choice of eating at the
cafeteria or bringing their lunches - are not convincing and empha-
size the difficulty of logical and equitable operation of the section.
The bank teller has an equal opportunity to bring his or her lunch.
The factory workers, on the other hand, may find it difficult to go
outside the factory to eat either because of a short lunch-break or
because no other facilities are available to them. The real factor
distinguishing the two situations, beyond the fact that the factory
worker pays a varying amount for his or her meal and thereby vio-
lates the cash/in kind rule of the statute,70 is that the factory owner
does not require that the employee eat on the premises but merely
requires that the employee be at work on time. The requirement
that the employee eat on the premises reflects employer attitudes
rather than any real difference in the compensation obtained by the
two employees or the business necessity of their being available,
as neither is on call during the break.
Business Premises
The third test of the statute, that the meals or lodging be fur-
nished on the business premises of the employer, has usually received
a strict geographic construction by the courts:
The statute does not say "at some convenient or reasonably
accessible" place; it does not say "in any nearby building" owned
by the employer. It says "on the business premises" of the
employer. These words mean what they say and should not
be given any strained or eccentric interpretation so as to frustrate
what the Legislature obviously tried to achieve.71
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(d)(8), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42.
70. Treas. Beg. § 1.119-1(a)(3)(fi), -1(d)(4), (7), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42.
See note 125 & accompanying text infra.
71. Dole v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 697, 708 (1965) (Raum, J., concurring), aff'd
per curiam, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965).
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Commissioner v. Anderson"2 provides a clean application of the
test. Anderson, who managed a motel and was required to be on
twenty-four-hour call, moved from the motel rooms occupied by his
family (tax free) to a house "two short blocks" from the motel. The
move was prompted by the motel owner because of the revenue loss
occasioned by Anderson's occupying the rooms. His duties before
and after the move were identical. The trial court allowed the ex-
clusion, noting that previous cases had rarely been decided on the
"business premises" issue.73 The appellate court reversed, strictly
construing the statutory language: "on" was not "near." The court
defined "business premises" as either (1) living quarters consti-
tuting an integral part of the business property or (2) premises on
which the company carries on business activities.74  The change from
the House's "place of employment" language to the present wording
was determined to be without effect.75 The court held that the
employer's ownership of the premises should not be decisive. An
opposite result would allow meals or lodging furnished on nonowned
premises to be excluded while allowing mere ownership to provide
a convenient basis for exclusion. Both outcomes would be contrary
to the section's intent.76
The "element of arbitrariness" which, the Anderson court noted,-,
is found in any bright-line test is even more pervasive than usual
in application of the business premises rule. In Lindeman v. Com-
missioner,78 a hotel operator case very near Anderson on its facts,
exclusion was allowed. Mr. Lindeman's house was situated on land
leased by the corporation adjacent to the hotel parking lot which was
located across the street from the hotel proper. The court disting-
uished Anderson, finding that the Lindeman home was "an indis-
pensable and inseparable part of the hotel property . . . within . . .
[its] perimeter," while Mr. Anderson's residence was located two
blocks from the motel.79  In determining that the Lindeman resi-
dence was an integral part of the business premises, the court an-
72. 371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
73. Anderson v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 410, 416 (1964), rev'd, 371 F.2d 59 (6th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
74. Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 66 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 906 (1967).
75. Id. at 64. See note 38 & accompanying text supra.
76. Id. at 67.
77. Id.
78. 60 T.C. 609 (1973).
79. Id. at 617.
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alyzed the functions performed by the employee at his lodging.80
The court concluded that a "substantial portion" of Lindeman's
duties was performed there even though Lindeman's duties did not
differ from those held to be not substantial in Anderson.
If Lindeman "sapped [Anderson] of its vitality to the point of
extinction"81 by allowing a functional analysis of the business prem-
ises rule, Adams v. United States 2 completed the process, at least
as to employer-owned premises. Following United States Junior
Chamber of Commerce v. United States,83 and a revenue ruling84
which excluded rental value of the official residence from a state
governor's income, the Adams court equated a showing of the em-
ployer's business interest in maintaining the residence with the de-
termination establishing that the house was "on the business premises"
for the purposes of the statute. Once the business premises test is
interpreted to infer "a functional rather than a spatial unity,"85 the
factors deemed relevant in deciding the business premises issue look
much like those which determined convenience of the employer.80
If this result is reached, the third test of section 119 is rendered
meaningless. Although the business premises test in the Code is
arbitrary, an opinion voiced even by those courts which honor it,
8 7
that test is contained in the statute. The functional analysis of
Adams contradicts the policy of strict construction of statutorily
granted exclusions and deductions.18
The state trooper cases provide an example of a situation in
which the courts have given widely divergent interpretations to the
business premises requirement. Four circuits have recognized the
80. This analysis is similar to that in United States Junior Chamber of Commerce
v. United States, 334 F.2d 660 (Ct. Cl. 1964). As the court noted, Lindeman sought
a favorable ruling on a strict geographic basis. The court apparently did not feel an
exclusion should be granted without an examination of the extent of the employee's
duties performed in his lodging. 60 T.C. at 616 n.5.
81. 60 T.C. at 617 (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
82. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9613 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
83. 334 F.2d 660 (Ct. Cl. 1964). See notes 52-56 & accompanying text supra.
84. Rev. Rul. 75-540, 1975-2 C.B. 53.
85. Adams v. United States, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. F[ 9613 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
86. "(1) the residence was built and owned by the employer . . . (3) the em-
ployee was required to live in the residence, (4) there were many business activities
for the employee to perform after normal working hours .... ." Id. at 88059.
87. Koerner v. United States, 550 F.2d 1362, 1364 (4th Cir. 1977); Commissioner
v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 67 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
88. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 47-49 (1949); Helvering
v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, 311 U.S. 46, 49 (1940).
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special nature of the state as an employer,89 to hold that the premises
of the state extend to "every road and highway in the state twenty-
four hours a day."90  Because the state can regulate and tax all land
within its borders, these courts held that the state exercised such a
degree of control that it was appropriate to regard all of the state
as "business premises." The First 9 and Fourth9 2 Circuits, following
the strict interpretation of the statute,93 did not subscribe to the
"metaphysical concept" of the Employer State with all-encompassing
business premises: "The state conducted no business in the public
restaurant. Nor was taxpayer performing, or going to perform, any
business there . . . . [T]he restaurant was not 'a place where the
employee performs a significant portion of his duties.' Rather, tax-
payer was there because he was off duty."9 4
The In Kind Rule
Even the courts which have denied the exclusion to highway
troopers seem uncomfortable with the business premises test, perhaps
because of its arbitrariness and difficulty of application to certain
situations. Most of the courts denying the exclusion, including the Su-
preme Court in the recent case of Commissioner v. Kowalski,9" have
chosen to base their decisions on another factor: whether the meals
were furnished to the taxpayer or whether he was reimbursed for
out-of-pocket expense in purchasing the meal from a restaurant. Al-
though the statutory intent was to exclude the value of meals and
lodging furnished in kind only, 6 extension of the convenience of the
employer rule to encompass cash reimbursements has seemed logical
to the bulk of courts deciding state trooper cases.
Saunders v. Commissioner,9" decided just prior to the effective
date of the 1954 Code, best illustrates the rationale for extending
the rule to allow exclusion of cash payments from income. The
89. United States v. Keeton, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th
Cir. 1963); Saunders v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954).
90. United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1963).
91. Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969).
92. Koerner v. United States, 550 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1977).
93. See note 71 & accompanying text supra.
94. Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694, 696 (1st Cir. 1977).
95. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 98 S. Ct. 315 (1977).
96. See note 34 & accompanying text supra.
97. 215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954).
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State of New Jersey had provided meals at way-stations operated
by its highway patrol but found that the practice was neither eco-
nomical nor efficient because troopers were required to drive many
more miles per day to reach the stations and the state's roads were
left unguarded during meal hours. Therefore, purely for its own
convenience, the state allowed the troopers to eat at designated res-
taurants along the highway and reimbursed them for their expense
to a stated maximum. The Saunders court adopted an expanded
convenience of the employer test, rejecting the cash/in kind distinc-
tion as artificial. The court reasoned that, if providing the meals
in the first case had been convenient, the reimbursement procedure
was clearly more convenient for the state's purposes. The Saunders
rationale was widely followed in cases in which the amount of the
reimbursement accurately reflected the amount expended, the troop-
ers were actually on call during their meals, the troopers were in
fact called to duty on occasion, and in which other indicia of em-
ployer control over the troopers during the meal were present.
The Tax Court 9s in Commissioner v. Kowalski99 did not follow
the Saunders common law convenience of the employer rule because,
it reasoned, enactment of the Code section limited availability of the
exclusion to cases meeting the tests of section 119. Because cash
allowances did not fall under the statutory rule, the exclusion was
denied.100 On appeal, the Third Circuit stated per curiam'0' that
it had not been persuaded to abandon the Saunders rule and allowed
the trooper to exclude the value of his meals, even though Saunders'
employer exercised very little control over when and where the meals
were eaten. Although the troopers were on call throughout their
lunchbreak, they could eat anywhere they chose, and they were not
required to spend any part of the meal allowance on food.10 2  The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 119, as the exclusive
authority for allowing exclusion of the meals, does not cover cash
payments of any kind.10 3
98. Kowalski v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 44 (1975).
99. 98 S. Ct. 315 (1977).
100. The taxpayer was allowed to deduct under I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) that portion
of his food allowance spent for meals eaten while away from home overnight. 65 T.C.
at 60-61.
101. Kowalski v. Commissioner, 76-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. ir 9769 (3d Cir. 1976).
102. The amount of the meal allowance varied with rank. Commissioner v. Kowal-
ski, 98 S. Ct. 315, 318 (1977).
103. Id. at 324-25.
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In basing the decision in Kowaiski on the intent of the legisla-
ture to exclude only in kind meals and lodging, the Court did not
comment on several aspects of the current interpretation of section
119 which have given difficulty to the lower courts. Kowalski could
have been decided solely on the business premises issue, a limitation
expressed in the section itself and therefore a clearer expression of
legislative intent than the cash/in kind rule. Strict construction of
the business premises test would have done much to reduce the ex-
clusion to its original proportions by reinstating the strict necessity
requirement abandoned by the holdings of United States Junior
Chamber of Commerce v. United States'0 4 and Adams v. United
States. 0 5 The courts are now in the precarious position of broadly
interpreting the business premises language, a test enunciated in
section 119, while requiring strict adherence to the in kind rule which
is to be found only in the legislative comment.
It might be argued that the special nature of the state trooper's
employment would make the business premises rule difficult to apply
in these situations. However, the Court's reliance on the cash/in
kind rule for its holding is no less arbitrary and equally fails to con-
sider the special nature of the state trooper's employment. The
Supreme Court was able to avoid any discussion of the merits of
the Saunders construction of the convenience of the employer rule
as it applies to state troopers by holding that the enactment of sec-
tion 119 definitively limited exclusion under the rule to those cases
satisfying the tests contained in the section. The Court's position
fails to address the logic of the Third Circuit's position in Saunders.
namely that, if the convenience of the employer is the paramount
test, exclusion of cash reimbursements should be allowed when there
is a clear showing that the meals are provided for the convenience
of the employer and that it is impractical for the employer to pro-
vide the meals in kind.
Because of the narrowness of the Supreme Court's ruling and
the special facts of the Kowalski case, the Court fails to offer any
guidance in situations which might vary from the facts of that case.
As the Court noted, even under the Saunders rule Kowalski could
not have taken the exclusion. 06 But a question does exist as to what
104. 334 F.2d 660 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
105. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 6745 (Ct. Cl. 1977). See notes 52-63 & accompanying
text supra.
106. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 98 S. Ct. 315, 325 (1977).
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the Court would have decided on facts similar to Saunders in which
the reimbursement reflected amounts expended and the trooper was
required to eat at a designated restaurant and time. Further, the
case offers no guidance to states that wish to provide their patrolmen
with the exclusion. Because the case did not deal with the business
premises issue, there is no indication whether value of meals will be
excluded for the state trooper's income if the state allows designated
restaurants to bill it for the costs of the troopers' meals. In such a
situation, the restaurant might be regarded as an agent of the state,
particularly if an agency relationship is created by legislative fiat or
by a simple declaration of that fact by the parties.
The cash/in kind rule is itself of questionable validity. The
reasoning of the legislature and of the Court in Kowalski, stemming
in part from the tenet that cash is presumptively compensatory, echoes
the early days of the common law rule when no exclusion was al-
lowed if the meals or lodging provided were deemed to have been
regarded even partly as compensation to the employee. 10 7  Whatever
the merits of this position, it conflicts with the clear statement of
section 119 that the compensatory element of the meals or lodging
will be ignored if the accommodations are truly furnished for the con-
venience of the employer.
Further, there is some question as to whether a reading of the
legislative history of section 119 should take into account section
120,108 a provision in the 1954 Code which excluded from income
cash allowances to state policemen to a $5 per day maximum. This
section was repealed four years after passage, 0 9 with the comment
107. See notes 21-25 & accompanying text supra.
108. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 120, 68A Stat. 39 (repealed 1958).
Section 120 provided:
"(a) GENEiAL RULE. - Gross income does not include any amount received as a
statutory subsistence allowance by an individual who is employed as a police official
by a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United States, by any political subdivision
of any of the foregoing, or by the District of Columbia.
(b) L rrATIoNs. -
(1) Amounts to which subsection (a) applies shall not exceed $5 per day.
(2) If any individual receives a subsistence allowance to which subsection
(a) applies, no deduction shall be allowed under any other provision of this chapter
for expenses in respect of which he has received such allowance, except to the extent
that such expenses exceed the amount excludable under subsection (a) and the excess
is otherwise allowable as a deduction under this chapter."
109. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-866, § 3, 72 Stat. 1606 (1958).
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that the exclusion was inequitable with regard to other taxpayers
who must incur like expenditures without benefit of tax break. 110
Repeal of section 120 was intended to have the effect of requiring
that the troopers make their case for exclusion of the reimbursement
under the tests applicable to all other taxpayers."' By repealing
section 120 the legislature may have intended to deny unilaterally
the exclusion to state troopers because few states would be prepared
to furnish the meals in kind. It could be argued, however, that the
"in kind" comments affixed to the original section 119 were intended
to apply to types of employment other than that of state troopers
and that, once section 120 was removed from the Code, the blanket
ban on exclusion from income of cash payments should be lifted as
to the state trooper if the convenience of the employer test were
otherwise satisfied."12
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Kowalski' 1 3 also failed
to clarify the validity of a series of holdings which were related to
Saunders v. Commissioner"4 but which did not involve cash reim-
bursements. In Tougher v. Commissioner,1 5 an employee of the
Federal Aviation Agency stationed at Wake Island was not allowed
to exclude from income"", the value of groceries purchased from the
FAA commissary even though there was no other practically avail-
able source for meals on the island. The court noted the intent of
the section to exclude the value only of meals furnished in kind but
based its denial of exclusion on the ground that groceries were not
"meals" within the meaning of the statute." 7  The court reasoned
that an employer who furnishes a "meal" controls the time, place,
duration, value, and content to suit its convenience; the purchase of
groceries did not involve these criteria. 1' 8
110. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4791, 4803.
111. The Senate comment indicated that one motive for repeal of the section was
unhappiness at the number of states which were changing their compensation systems
to qualify for the statutory exclusion. This practice was felt to thwart the intent of
the statute to recognize the special nature of the employment. Id.
112. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 98 S. Ct. 315, 324-25 (1977).
113. 98 S. Ct. 315 (1977).
114. 215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954).
115. 51 T.C. 737 (1969).
116. Actually, the taxpayer attempted to deduct the amount expended on groceries.
The court elected to treat the maneuver as an attempt at exclusion from income under
section 119. Id. at 743-44.
117. Id. at 745-46.
118. Id. at 745.
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The definition of "meal" as "food that is prepared for consump-
tion at such recognized occasions as breakfast, lunch, dinner, or sup-
per" was rejected by the Third Circuit in Jacob v. United States.119
In that case groceries were provided, in kind, to the director of a
mental institution who was required to be on twenty-four-hour call.
The court noted that the only difference between an employer's fur-
nishing prepared meals and furnishing groceries is that the employer
is relieved of the intermediate task of preparing the meal. The cen-
tral focus of availability of the employee on the premises remains
the same: funishing groceries may simply be more "convenient"
for the employer. "We see no logical reason why entitlement to the
exclusion contained in section 119 should hinge upon who cooks the
meal."120
Jacob relied on the state trooper cases' allowance of exclusion
to support its broad reading of section 119,121 although none of those
cases dealt with the definition of "meals." In Kowaiski v. Commis-
sioner,12 2 the Third Circuit relied on the Jacob recognition of the
broader definition of "meals" expressed in the state trooper cases in
allowing Kowalski to take the exclusion. The Supreme Court in
Kowalski123 impliedly overruled Jacob by its strict reading of the
statutory intent as to the cash/in kind issue, but it is by no means
certain that Jacob has lost its validity as to the meals/grocery issue
because the discussion in Kowaiski did not mention this variation
on the rule.
Kowaiski did not consider another situation in which exclusion
has been allowed but which is scarcely distinguishable from the cash
reimbursement scheme: the situation in which the employer de-
ducts a fixed amount from the employee's paycheck as payment for
the furnished meals.124 The exclusion is allowed provided the em-
119. 493 F.2d 1294 (3d Cir. 1974).
120. Id. at 1296. Rev. Rul. 77-80, 977-1 C.B. 36, which denied an exclusion to
members of a religious order who were given a cash allowance to buy groceries, how-
ever, ignored Jacob and required that the allowance be included in income on the basis
that groceries were not meals within the terms of the section. The fact that the gro-
ceries were not furnished in kind was not considered.
121. Jacob v. United States, 493 F.2d 1294, 1297 (3d Cir. 1974).
122. Kowalski v. Commissioner, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9769 (3d Cir. 1976). By
relying on Jacob v. United States, 493 F.2d 1294 (3d Cir. 1974), rather than on Saunders
v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954), the Third Circuit avoided any con-
sideration of the effect of the enactment of § 119 on the common law rule.
123. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 98 S. Ct. 315 (1977).
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(3)(ii), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42.
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ployee is able to meet the convenience of the employer and business
premises tests of section 119.125 Allowance of the exclusion is war-
ranted in light of the section's statement that the labeling of meals
and lodging as compensatory is not determinative, 126 especially be-
cause the labeling may be primarily a bookkeeping procedure for
employers who must include the value of such accommodations as
"wages" or "compensation" for tax or other purposes. 127  The Treas-
ury Regulations allow the exclusion in this situation if the employee
is charged an "unvarying amount," regardless of whether or not he
actually accepts the meals or lodging. 128
In practice, however, the difference between the employment sit-
uations in which exclusion is permitted and those in which it is not is
difficult to see. In Revenue Ruling 67-259,129 an Army hospital, which
formerly furnished meals to its civilian food service employees for
which they were charged a fixed sum, changed its policy to eliminate
the payroll deduction and to provide that employees would make cash
payment for all meals consumed. All other conditions remained the
same. The exclusion was allowed in the former situation; in the latter
it was not. It could be argued that under the new procedure the con-
venience to the employer was greater because accounting procedures
were simplified and amounts paid by employees more nearly reflected
the value of the meals consumed. The Ruling based its disparate
treatment of identically situated employees on the purely formal
change in the procedure by which meals were furnished to the em-
ployees. This is a somewhat anomalous result in view of the fact
that section 119 was enacted in part to counteract the effect of a
formal characterization of meals or lodging as "compensatory."
Basis for Exclusion Outside Section 119
The taxpayer who wishes to exclude a cash reimbursement for
meals from income may attempt to look beyond section 119 for aid.
125. The logical gymnastic which allows such accommodation to be regarded as
furnished in kind is explained as follows: "In Boykin the mandatory withholding of
a fixed amount for rent from the employee's formally designated salary could be re-
garded in substance as restating his true salary to be the diminished amount thereof,
and the employer could be regarded as furnishing the employee the lodging in kind."
Tougher v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 737, 744-45 n.6 (1969).
126. See notes 31-32 & accompanying text supra.
127. See Rev. Rul. 73-381, 1973-2 C.B. 125; Rev. Rul. 72-385, 1972-2 C.B. 535;
Mim. 5657, 1944 C.B. 550.
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(3)(ii), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 44.
129. 1967-2 C.B. 76.
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For example, the taxpayer in Commissioner v. Kowalski'3" argued
that the meals allowance was not "income" as defined in section 61
and, further, that a line of cases and rulings recognized a common
law convenience of the employer exclusion from income in cases in
which the allowance was not compensatory.' 3 ' Trooper Kowalski
argued that, although "income" under section 61 is defined broadly,
it is not all-inclusive, as evidenced implicitly by the number of stat-
utes defining the term and by the fact that "gross income" in a busi-
ness context is defined otherwise. 132  The trooper pointed to the fact
that the exclusion from income of commutation of rations and quar-
ters for the Armed Forces, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the
Public Health Service is promulgated generally under section 61 and
not under any specific statutory provision.133  The ruling applies
even to the National Guard, although that body is technically an
arm of the state. Some fringe benefits,13 4 including "supper money"
for employees, are also excluded from income under section 61.135
These exclusions seem to indicate that the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine is alive and well in common law and is not exclu-
sively embodied in section 119. This conclusion is buttressed by
the fact that the Senate added the old term to the statutory test,
possibly intending to incorporate the common law doctrine where it
was not explicitly contradicted by other portions of the statute.
Saunders v. Commissioner 36 would therefore be relevant as regard-
ing payments not intended to be compensatory.
130. 98 S. Ct. 315 (1977).
131. Brief for Respondent at 9-21, Commissioner v. Kowalski, 98 S. Ct. 315 (1977).
132. Id. See I.R.C. §§ 71-84; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3, T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163.
133. Brief for Respondent at 13-21, Commissioner v. Kowalski, 98 S. Ct. 315
(1977) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(b), T.D. 6856, 1965-2 C.B.30). However, the same
regulation specifically denies an exclusion for meals and lodging furnished by an On-
ployer unless the taxpayer meets the test of § 119. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(b), T.D.
6856, 1965-2 C.B. 30.
134. No regulation embodies the fringe benefit rule as such. The principles under-
lying the tacit recognition of the Service that such items need not be reported seems
to be lack of employer inconvenience and the practical difficulties of valuation, with-
holding, and enforcement if such benefits were required to be reported. See Summary
& Explanation of Discussion Draft of Proposed Regulations on Fringe Benefits, 40 Fed.
Reg. 41118 (1975). For an exhaustive discussion of the rule, see Note, Federal Income
Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 89 HAIIRv. L. REv. 1141 (1976).
135. The legislative guide to the 1954 Code notes that "supper money" may not
be excluded from income under the provisions of § 119. GrE To TENAL
RBEvEN E CoDE: OF 1954, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1955] U.S. CoDE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1183, 1228.
136. 215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954).
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Along with every court which has considered a section 119 case,
the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Kowalski'3 7 gave short shrift
to the section 61 argument. After United States v. Glenshaw
Glass'3 and Commissioner v. LoBuel "' it is difficult to argue success-
fully that a benefit rendered to the taxpayer by his or her employer
will not be considered income, particularly when the payment is in
cash, which is presumptively compensatory. 140 The Supreme Court
is on firm ground when it simply states that all accessions to wealth
are income unless specifically excluded by statute,14 ' even though
this statement overlooks the existence of the fringe benefit and Armed
Services rules, under which the exclusions are not granted by stat-
ute.142  The Court also destroyed any hope of a basis for exclusion
in the common law rule.' 43  There is some question concerning the
intent of the Senate in adding the "convenience of the employer"
term to the statutory test, but the Court had little difficulty in de-
termining that the legislature by both expanding the former law (to
include meals and lodging characterized as compensatory) and con-
tracting it (by the business premises test) did not intend to incor-
porate the law already existing around that term but rather intended
to replace the former law with section 119.114
An attractive alternate ground for avoiding a tax on the value
of meals and lodging has been suggested by several courts: a de-
duction of their value from income under section 162(a)(2) as an
ordinary and necessary expense of being an employee.14'4  The same
factors which indicate that accommodations are furnished for the
convenience of the employer will generally allow those accommoda-
137. 98 S. Ct. 315 (1977).
138. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
139. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
140. Saunders v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1954).
141. 98 S. Ct. at 319.
142. The Court in Kowalski specifically did not decide whether the "supper money"
exclusion might be justified on grounds other than § 119. 98 S. Ct. 315, 324 n.28.
There is no question that the Service has the power to tax such fringe benefits; witness
the $50,000 limitation imposed on group-term employee life insurance, an area previ-
ously regarded as within the fringe benefit rule. I.R.C. § 79.
143. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
144. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 98 S. Ct. 315, 325 (1977).
145. Id. at 326 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d
199 (8th Cir. 1966) (§ 162 deduction proposed as alternate relief had taxpayer not
qualified under § 119); Cooper v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 870 (1977) (fireman allowed
§ 162 deduction on meals eaten at stationhouse).
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tions to be considered as business expenses rather than as nonde-
ductible personal expenses under section 262. The chief deterrent
to claiming such a deduction is the rule in United States v. Correll,14 6
which allows the deduction only if the taxpayer stays away from home
overnight.147 The rationale for the overnight rule is that the taxpayer
incurs duplicate expenses only when his travel involves expenditures
for both meals and lodging; to allow a traveler to take a deduction
for meals consumed on short trips would discriminate against com-
muting workers who must also eat away from home but for whom the
cost of meals is a nondeductible personal expense.
The overnight rule has been criticized as an embroidering of
the actual intent of the legislature in passing section 162148 because
no reference to this qualification is made either in the legislative
comment or in section 162 itself. Nevertheless Correll presently
stands as the law. It is not within the province of this short Article
to deal with the validity of Correll, except to say that a taxpayer
seeking to deduct the value of meals and lodging would have to
overcome the overnight rule to do so or be able in some specific
situations to argue that the meals and lodging are ordinary and
necessary expenses of a trade or business or for the production of
income.
In Commissioner v. Kowalski, 14 the Supreme Court did little to
resolve the confusion created by a quarter-century of conflicting in-
terpretation of section 119 by the courts. Saunders v. Commission-
er"1° and the common law convenience of the employer rule are
overruled, narrowly, on a set of facts which would not have met the
common law standard. After Kowalski, cash payments for meals and
lodging may not be excluded from income unless they are construc-
tive payments of a fixed sum subtracted from the employee's pay-
check. The value of groceries provided to the employee by his or
her employer in lieu of meals must likely be included in the em-
ployee's gross income, based on an extended reading of the in kind
146. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
147. The wording "meals and lodging" was seen by the Court in Corr ell as indi-
cating that a § 162 deduction must involve both elements and that the trip must there-
fore be an overnight one. 389 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
148. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 98 S. Ct. 315, 326 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Waters v. Commissioner, 12-T.C. 414, 416-17 (1949).
149. 98 S. Ct. 315 (1977).
150. 215 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954).
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doctrine and an implied overruling of Jacob v. United States1 51 by
the Supreme Court. The confusion is compounded by interpreta-
tions of the two other statutory tests. The relaxed, "functional" in-
terpretation of the business premises test of United States Junior
Chamber of Commerce v. United States'5 2 and Adams v. United
States153 will find a residence to be on the premises of the employer
for the purposes of the section if the employee performs a substantial
portion of his duties there - duties as to which the employee none-
theless retains almost complete discretion regarding the time and
manner of performance. The "direct nexus" interpretation of the
employer convenience test will allow one executive to exclude the
value of his residence from income while denying the exclusion to
another similarly situated.
A Proposal for Equity and Clarity
Any attempt to correct the unequal treatment of taxpayers un-
der section 119 by a reversal of current trends in interpretation of
the section15 4 will be merely cosmetic if the premise behind opera-
tion of the section remains unexamined. It is therefore necessary
to question whether there is any justification for the continued exis-
tence of a provision which results in such substantial taxpayer con-
fusion and which contains serious elements of actual and potential
inequity. As previously stated, the revenue loss created by section
119 is not an insubstantial one, 155 and it is increasing every year. Al-
though the court in Commissioner v. Kowalskil"6 eliminated one fairly
minor cause of revenue loss, it left a multitude of situations which
greatly reduce tax revenue and in which taxpayers are treated different-
ly because of the ability of some to sustain a showing that the meals
or lodging were furnished for the convenience of the employer. In-
deed, if there is any validity to the basic premise of section 119,
Kowalski reduced that validity by increasing the inequitable opera-
tion of the section through the determination that the availability
of the exclusion depends on the happenstance of whether the receipt
151. 493 F.2d 1294 (3d Cir. 1974).
152. 334 F.2d 660 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
153. 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ir 9613 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
154. This might be accomplished, for example, by a return to the strict standard
of the business premises test or of an interpretation of the cash/in kind rule consonant
with the philosophy of the convenience of the employer doctrine.
155. See note 7 & accompanying text supra.
156. 98 S. Ct. 315 (1977).
[Vol. 29
is in kind or in cash, without any regard for the reason behind the
employer's choice of the particular method.
It is the position of the authors that section 119 as presently
written is not justified either as a matter of appropriate tax law policy
or under the basic concept that voluntary compliance with the tax
law is more difficult to elicit if there is inequitable treatment of tax-
payers. The section, both by its terms and possibly even to a greater
extent by its interpretation, provides a special privilege tax advan-
tage based on the nature of the employment and the ability of the
employer and employee to make the necessary environmental adjust-
ment. The fact that it gives tax relief in many cases to the less af-
fluent of our employed does not make it any more palatable. It dis-
guises additional compensation in a myriad of instances in which the
convenience of the employer may technically be present but in which
the acceptance of the benefit does not place a burden on the em-
ployee. The effect is to thus produce a tax break not given to other
taxpayers who are in fact similarly situated. In many situations the
convenience to the employer results primarily from the fact that the
employer is able to pay substantially less in wages than the cost of
the items furnished.
It is time to dispel the tax fiction which states that it is a burden
for the employee to live or eat on the employer's premises. When
one looks at the living accommodations acquired by most highly paid
executives, it is difficult to agree with the suggestion implied in the
opinion of a court that Adams, 157 as an example, would have chosen
substantially more modest quarters than those furnished by his em-
ployer if he had been left to his own devices. It is more likely that,
if Adams had been required to pay his own costs of lodging in Japan,
he would have demanded sufficient additional salary to compensate
him for the additional cost over comparable housing in the United
States. It appears to be entirely inequitable to give Adams free
lodging while another employee transferred to a less important post
in Japan by the same company who is not given a company dwelling
would either bear the entire burden of increased cost or would pay
income tax on the amount reimbursed to him by the employer.
The most desirable way to eliminate the problems created by the
operation of section 119 is simply to repeal the section and treat all
157. See generally Adams v. United States, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9613 (Ct. C1.
1977).
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taxpayers identically as to inclusion in income of payments in cash
or in kind. It is true that there may be some administrative diffi-
culty in the valuation of meals and lodging furnished in kind. In
many instances, however, the items furnished to the employees are
sold to others for cash and could be valued on the same basis. In
the comparatively few instances when this procedure is not available,
a formula for valuation similar to that used for social security 58 and
wage and hours law administration 5 9 would be a less than perfect
but possible solution.
If section 119 is repealed, an employee could still contend that
in a particular situation the meals or lodging are essential to the
employee's trade or business or to production of income under In-
ternal Revenue Code section 162 or 212 and that, if the value is to
be included in income, an offsetting deduction must be allowed.
The courts have in special instances allowed the deduction of em-
ployee expenses under these sections, such as for work clothes,160 for
employment agency fees,1' and, in at least two Tax Court decisions,
for the amount deducted by an employer for meals available to the
employee. 1 2  It could also be argued by the employee that the
amount in excess of what he or she can prove would have been the
normal expenditure for meals or lodging is a deductible expense
under section 162 or 212.163 The use of these sections to cover cer-
tain special instances would ameliorate some of the more difficult
situations and materially reduce the inequity inherent in section 119.
But as noted,164 the employee would still be faced with the "over-
night rule" of Correll v. United States'6" in attempting to claim a
deduction under section 162.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1973).
159. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 548.3 (1976).
160. E.g., Jackson v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 1071 (1970); Yeomans v.
Commissioner, 30 T.C. 757 (1958); see Rev. Rul. 70-474, 1970-2 C.B. 34.
161. E.g., Cremona v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 219 (1972); Primuth v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
162. Sibla v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 422 (1977); Cooper v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.
870 (1977).
163. This approach would be analogous to that used in Sutter v. Commissioner,
21 T.C. 170 (1953): "[T]he presumptive nondeductibility of personal expenses may
be overcome only by clear and detailed evidence as to each instance that the expendi-
ture in question was different from or in excess of that which would have been made
for the taxpayer's personal purposes." Id. at 173.
164. See notes 146-48 & accompanying text supra.
165. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
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After having watched and heard the expostulations of lobbyists
for the hotel and restaurant interests concerning attempts to eliminate
tax advantages which helped bring about our expense account econ-
omy and the attendant lack of appropriate tax reform as a result,
it would be naive to expect that a proposal to repeal section 119
would elicit any lesser amount of complaint from corporate execu-
tives, hotel and motel operators, representatives of culinary and hotel
employee unions, and other interested employees. It is probable
that the claim would again be heard that such a change would make
it impossible to run a hotel or to obtain employees for restaurants
and that universities and certain charitable institutions could not
properly perform their worthwhile tasks. Even if these complaints
could be substantiated, they do not justify a clear discrimination be-
tween taxpayers who in a real sense are identically situated. A
method to avert the alleged catastrophe which does not use the tax
laws as a vehicle should be adopted. It is submitted, however, that
there is very little evidence that the elimination of section 119 would
have the deleterious effect claimed by those who now have the ben-
efit of the provisions of the section. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that
the drastic change suggested above will be adopted in the near fu-
ture, especially in view of the fact that repeal of section 119 appar-
ently has not been a part of any recent suggestions for tax reform.
Therefore, any realistic proposals for reducing or eliminating the
inequities caused by the operation of section 119 must include an
alternative to complete deletion of the section. Although it would
not completely eliminate the confusion or inequity, it would be worth-
while to draft an adequate definition of the phrase "convenience of
the employer." This is admittedly a difficult task, but it is sub-
mitted that, if the exclusion is to be retained, the basis for the ex-
clusion should be that the furnishing of the meals or lodging is func-
tionally necessary for the operations of the employer. It is therefore
suggested that the current tests of the statute be replaced by the re-
quirement that the meals or lodging be "functionally necessary for
the operations of the employer." The burden of proof that an ex-
penditure is functionally necessary to the employer's operation should
not be unduly heavy, although it certainly should be more than a
formality. A showing that without the furnishing of meals or lodg-
ing an essential activity is not feasible of operation or that such fur-
nishing significantly decreases the operating costs (other than an in-
crease in wages which otherwise would be required) or reduces the
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number of required personnel may bring the accommodations pro-
vided within the modified provision.
Once the functionally necessary test is met, the taxpayer should
be allowed to exclude a specified amount without regard to whether
the meals and lodging were furnished in kind or as a cash reimburse-
ment and without regard to whether furnished on the business prem-
ises of the employer. A schedule of allowances could be established
which would afford a complete exclusion to the restaurant employee
but would impose some tax consequences on the corporate executive
or a hotel by reason of the additional includable income.
If this formula approach is adopted, it would probably be nec-
essary to recognize that there are instances when the facilities fur-
nished to the employee are of substantially greater value than he
would have acquired except for the employment but are not realistical-
ly compensation. In such cases there should be room for proof of that
fact and for an additional exclusion up to full value where the test
is met. However, the criteria for meeting this burden of proof
should be made so substantial as not to be easily avoided. It should
be made clear that the facilities furnished are within the exclusion
only when their provision is essential to the carrying out of the func-
tions of the employer's business.
Although this proposed alternative to the present section 119
might increase the number of persons benefiting from the rule by
allowing the exclusion of cash payments, it is submitted that this
exclusion is essential to insure at least some semblance of equitable
treatment of taxpayers. The proposal would materially reduce the
revenue loss notwithstanding the possible increase in the number of
beneficiaries, and would result in a sounder tax law approach. Al-
though it is to be expected that the argument will be made that this
alternative will involve too great an administrative burden, there is
little evidence that in this age of sophisticated computerization there
would be more work in administering the proposed formula than in
performing the present task of sorting out and evaluating the multi-
tude of arrangements presently in effect.
It should be remembered, however, that the proposal suggested
is only an alternative solution to a problem which could best be rem-
edied by elimination of the exclusion. If we want to achieve thl
equality and fairness which Justice Robert Jackson said is so es-
sential to the administration of a self-assessment system of taxation,
we should get rid of this barnacle on our income tax system.
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